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Abstract 
 
The influence of New Public Management (NPM) on public sector organisation is 
nowhere more evident or pervasive than in the field of school governance where 
political actors, school leaders and governors are called upon to make the internal 
operation of the school more transparent and accountable to others through the 
explicitness of performance indicators and output measurements.  Yet despite the 
prevalence of corporate and performative models of school governance within and 
across different education systems, there are various cases of uneven, hybrid 
expressions of NPM that reveal the contingency of global patterns of rule in the 
context of changing political-administrative structures.  Adopting a ‘decentred 
approach’ to governance (Bevir 2010), this paper compares the development of 
NPM in four OECD countries: Australia, England, Spain, and Switzerland.  A focus of 
the paper is how certain policy instruments are created and sustained within highly 
differentiated geo-political settings and through different multi-scalar actors and 
authorities yet modified to reflect established traditions and practices.  The result is a 
nuanced account of the complex terrain on which NPM is grafted onto and translated 
to reflect inherited institutional landscapes and political settlements and dilemmas.   
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Introduction 
 
Evidence from the field of comparative and international education point to the 
widespread use of data infrastructures, comparative-competitive frameworks, test-
based accountabilities, consumer logics, and philanthropic networks as tools of 
global education governance (Ball and Junemann 2012; Lingard, Martino, and 
Rezai-Rashti 2013; Ozga 2012; Robertson 2016; Verger and Parcerisa 2018).  A key 
strength and insight of this work has been its attention to the multiple interacting 
forces that flow vertically (through transnational agenda setting and national 
government policy making) and horizontally (through policy communities, inspection 
bodies and school boards) to compel certain kinds of organisation of the school, 
particularly in ways that help to anchor the school to global policy processes.  Yet 
despite strong evidence to suggest a global convergence of trends in the way that 
many schools govern themselves, these same researchers are critical of the idea 
that global policy processes move uniformly and predictably across nations, spaces, 
places, institutions, and peoples.  Instead, they claim, policy enactments are not only 
refracted through subnational and national interests and strategic priorities but are 
mediated by complex forms of ‘networked governance’ in which policy decisions and 
instrumentation reflect ever-deepening relationships between education and the 
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interests and influence of businesses, social enterprises and charities (Ball and 
Junemann 2012; Olmedo, Bailey and Ball 2013). 
 
Similarly, these researchers are circumspect of concepts like policy borrowing, 
diffusion and transfer since they give the impression of global policy processes fitting 
seamlessly with practices of self-governance within subnational and national policy 
contexts and their unique networks, connections and flows (see Gulson et al. 2017; 
Silova 2012).  Instead, such researchers are more attentive to the complicated 
distribution of global patterns of rule in the context of fluid, diverse geo-political 
settlements, therefore allowing greater scope for disjunctions to emerge between 
global policy processes and policy instantiations mediated by local politics and 
projects (Ball, Maguire and Braun 2012; Beech and Artopoulos 2015; Verger, 
Fontdevila and Parcerisa 2019).  Adding to this growing body of literature, this paper 
adopts a ‘decentred approach’ to governance (Bevir 2010) in order to trace the 
uneven development of New Public Management (NPM) in the field of school 
governance within four OECD countries: Australia, England, Spain, and Switzerland.   
 
A decentred approach 
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According to Bevir (2010, 437), a ‘decentred view implies that different people draw 
on different traditions to reach different beliefs about any pattern of governance’.  In 
some cases, similar global patterns of governance can be discerned within and 
across highly diverse geo-political settings, each with their own distinctive political-
administrative structures and historical traditions.  Yet, according to Bevir (2010, 
437), these patterns of governance must be read as ‘a contingent product of a 
contest of meanings in action’.  On this account, the existence of similar patterns of 
governance in a plurality of sites does not imply that organisational structures and 
practices flow uniformly from global policy processes but, instead, can be more 
precisely understood as the resultant formation of a confrontation with global policy 
processes and its modification in the context of an ‘inherited institutional landscape’ 
(Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 3).  As Li (2007, 13) argues, 'what appears to be 
rational landscape design or ‘management’ is the serendipitous outcome of everyday 
practices that have quite disparate motives'.  These disparate motives are shaped by 
the novel arrangement of different geo-political settlements and their unique laws, 
values systems, accountability infrastructures, and institutional orders.   
 
From a policy assemblage perspective (Rabinow 2014), these various components 
are the autonomous parts that make up the loose and contested field we call ‘school 
governance’.  The implication here is that school governance is not simply the 
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residual effect of NPM, even if NPM and its related discourses appear as a dominant 
framing for school governance and its constituent parts, operations and instruments.  
As we demonstrate in this paper, NPM is grafted onto existing structures and 
practices, and therefore NPM is a loose assembly of globally circulating discourse 
and situated practices and normative commitments. 
 
Configurations of school governance 
 
Here we use the term ‘school governance’ in the widest sense to describe a 
polycentric system of governing in which the powers to intervene in the running of 
schools are decoupled from the centre and tightly or loosely coupled to other 
government and non-government authorities, including subnational political 
authorities (such as regions, municipalities and local authorities), private 
management groups and school boards.  These powers to intervene may include the 
power to regulate and amend laws; the power to monitor educational outcomes; the 
power to allocate resources and distribute funding; the power to employ staff and 
determine staff pay and conditions; the power to design the curriculum and 
admissions policy; and the power to broker or commission new education providers.  
Yet despite clear disparities in the formation and expansion of school governance, 
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there are various policy instruments that transcend and overlap subnational and 
national borders as dominant configurations for the development of education 
systems and their constituent parts.  A dominant configuration to which we now turn 
is NPM with its emphasis on ‘output controls…private-sector styles of management 
practice [and] greater discipline and parsimony in resource use’ (Hood 1991, 4-5).   
 
A key function of NPM has been to limit the discretion of public servants through a 
tighter focus on contract, corporate and performative measures of accountability 
(Ranson 2010).  In education, NPM is evident in the way public servants, namely 
political actors, school leaders and governors, strive to attest to the effectiveness, 
efficiency and quality of their organisations, usually in ways that make a necessity of 
certain private sector logics and globally circulating discourses of ‘educational 
excellence’ and ‘good governance’ (Wilkins 2016).  Operationally and strategically, 
this requires school leaders and governors to discipline themselves within a 
framework of rational self-management that inscribes and performs what Power 
(1997) calls ‘rituals of verification’, namely compliance checking and performance 
monitoring.  Yet NPM is typically accommodated within pre-existing relations and 
structures and therefore does not appear everywhere the same reproduction or 
outcome of predetermined sequencing (see Gunter et al. 2016).   
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On this account, NPM should not be viewed as a seamless transformation of 
discourse into practice since it tends to be overlaid and aligned with existing political-
administrative structures, such as traditional forms of government which are still 
prevalent in many countries and which extend to the discretionary powers of some 
civil servants, elected councillors and school leaders and governors to shape 
strategic planning, curriculum, learning priorities, and resource allocation.  Therefore, 
a more nuanced account of NPM is needed, one that not only captures its 
variegated, hybrid, locally adapted expressions across diverse geo-political settings, 
but which also provides some account of how NPM is taken up and revised to 
complement existing normative commitments and situated practices.   
 
Uneven developments 
 
To provide such an account, this paper documents the uneven development of NPM 
in the field of school governance across four OECD countries: Australia, England, 
Spain, and Switzerland.  We have chosen to analyse and compare these four 
countries since they share some strong commonalities as well as some key 
differences.  A key difference being that schools in Switzerland and Spain have less 
autonomy compared to schools in England and Australia.  This is not to say that 
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schools in Switzerland and Spain do not exercise autonomy in relation to shaping 
pedagogy and teaching practices in unique ways, yet, unlike many schools in 
England and Australia, they do not have responsibility for resource allocation, staff 
pay and conditions, putting contracts out to tender, and other ‘back-office functions’ 
linked to school management (see ‘Table 1: Variegated School Governance’ below).   
Table 1: Variegated School Governance 
 
Switzerland England Spain Australia
Regulation Regulation of schools devolved 
away from federal government and 
downward to 'cantons' (municipal 
authorities) who oversee funding, 
curricula, teacher salaries, law 
making and development of 
accountability and assessment 
frameworks.
Tight regulation of schools by central 
government in terms of law making 
and development of accountability and 
assessment frameworks.  
Responsibility for funding allocation 
and statutory requirements is devolved 
to some county and regional bodies 
called local education authorities.
Tight regulation of schools across 
seventeen regions by central 
government in terms of law making, 
funding, teacher management and 
development of accountability and 
assessment frameworks.
Schools are funded by federal and state 
governments, with state-federal 
contractual agreements enabling the 
implementation of national strategic goals 
and national curriculum, testing and 
professional standards authorities. State 
governments have constitutional 
responsibility for schools, with state-based 
authorities responsible for school 
operations, school improvement, strategic 
priorities, and legal frameworks. 
Management Low school autonomy. 
Municipalities called cantons hire 
headteachers and teachers, 
manage budgets, have  
organisational and pedagogical 
freedom, and increasing 
responsibility of accountability, 
albeit limited powers to intervene in 
the running of schools.
Medium to high school autonomy.  
Many schools run as 'state-funded 
independent schools' or academies 
(over 30% of all schools are 
academies), while majority of schools 
are local government maintained.  
Foundations and boards of trustees set 
up to manage schools independent of 
local education authorities.  These 
boards of trustees answer to central 
government by way of contractual 
obligations, governance objectives and 
educational performance.
Low school autonomy. Region-wide 
government authorities or municipalities 
in some cases are owners of schools 
and responsible for hiring teachers, 
funding allocation, site management, 
teacher pay and conditions, and 
assessment frameworks.  Some 
schools retain autonomy only in relation 
to issues of pedagogy.
Medium autonomy. The degree of 
autonomy differs according to 
state/territory. Many public schools have a 
range of administrative responsibilities, but 
none are fully self-governing. As the 
constitutional responsibility of state 
authorities, schools answer to state 
authorities.
Participatory 
governance
Many schools retain a 
democratically organised school 
board that is responsible for the 
administration of the school.
Most schools retain a school governing 
body consisting of volunteers (senior 
leaders, teachers, parents, business 
leaders) who are required to monitor 
the educational and financial 
performance of the school.  School 
governng bodies have been removed 
from some schools run by large multi-
academy trusts. 
Many schools retain a less than 
democratically organised school board 
made up of senior leaders, teachers, 
parents, and administration staff.  
Currently only teachers possess right to 
vote on key school matters, unlike 
parents who possess no rights.  
Responsibilities of school board do not 
extend to matters of budget allocation, 
but are mostly focussed on pedagogical 
and organizational issues.
School boards and school councils exist in 
most Australian states. The role and 
influence of the boards/councils differ 
across states. There are also Parents and 
Citizens Associations who conduct 
volunteer activities like fundraising and 
running school canteens, but who rarely 
influence matters of school governance. 
Inspection Inspections carried out by cantonal 
inspectorates (integrated in 
cantonal administration) or  
delegated to inspection agencies.  
External inspection may 
supplement cantonal supervision 
by inspectorates or even replace it.  
Inspection agency is Ofsted, a national, 
non-ministerial inspection body 
commissioned by central government 
to carry out evaluations of school’s 
educational performance.
School inspections conducted by 
regional inspectors who are publicly-
employed civil servants.
School inspections are carried out by state-
based authorities. Each state has its own 
standards/education services agencies. 
Federal agencies do not conduct 
inspections. 
Leadership Head teachers and new leadership 
conditions now more powerful than 
school boards and inspection 
agencies and who conduct 
'supervision' of teachers.
Head teachers are employees of the 
school governing body or board of 
trustees, who in turn are accountable 
to central government.
Head teachers were formerly employed 
on the basis of rank or seniority (‘primus 
inter pares’).  Since 2009 teachers must 
follow the rules of a specific ‘master’ to 
become eligible for headship.  Their 
eligibility is decided by a committee of 
inspectors and head teachers.
Head teachers are employees of state 
departments of education, yet head 
teacher appointments differ across 
Australian states and territories.  In 
Victoria, a selection panel assesses 
applications and the school council 
recommends to the Department a head 
teacher for employment.  In New South 
Wales, the selection panel is composed of 
a Department Director (the convener), 
teacher representative, parents and citizen 
representatives, and another head teacher.
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Despite these differences, all the above countries share some commonalities.  
These commonalities include a strong connection and commitment to democracy (or 
claims to democracy) as a principle lever for shaping decisions about education 
planning, funding and delivery.  Such commitments to democracy can be traced to 
the existence of locally representative school boards in all four countries.  Called 
‘Schulpflege’ or ‘Schulkommission’ in Switzerland and ‘Consejo Escolar’ in Spain, 
school boards typically consist of both lay and professional members drawn from the 
school and the wider community.  A key function of school boards (broadly 
understood) is to enhance accountability downwards to various stakeholders, 
including community members, parents, teachers, staff members, and students; to 
enhance accountability outwards towards inspection agencies and professional 
standard bodies; and to enhance accountability upwards towards the regulators and 
funders of education, be they federal, state or municipal authorities.  In the case of 
Australia, commitments to democracy have been largely shaped by strong social 
democratic-professional education bureaucracies rather than the existence of school 
boards which have not played a large role in the governance of schools in Australia.  
Moreover, despite attempts to involve parents and citizens in education, it is the 
teaching profession and state education departments that have historically shaped 
decisions about education.  More recently, however, school boards have become 
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more important to school governance in Australia under reforms to strengthen school 
autonomy. 
 
While the responsibilities and delegated powers of school boards vary depending on 
the country, a key role of school boards as ‘intermediary associations’ (Ranson et al. 
2005, 359) is to bring lay and professional judgements to bear upon the actions of 
those who run schools, namely head teachers and middle leaders.  These 
interventions are designed to ensure that schools are publicly accountable – properly 
audited and monitored, high achieving, financially sustainable, law compliant, and 
non-discriminatory.  In this sense, school boards in some contexts replace direct 
steering from the centre – a federal or central government for example – and offer 
unique opportunities to trace the translation of NPM among different multi-scalar 
actors and authorities who inhabit and perform different functions of school 
governance.  Adopting a ‘decentred approach’ (Bevir 2010), the following 
comparative analysis traces the uneven development of NPM in four countries, with 
a focus on how certain policy instruments – specifically, private sector logics and 
accountability processes – are arranged, joined-up and ‘made to cohere’ (Li 2007, 
264) in the field of school governance.  Specifically, we focus on how NPM is taken 
up and resisted or revised within different political-administrative settlements to 
complement existing political structures and value systems. 
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Governance and democracy 
 
As a federation, each of Australia’s eight states and territory governments has 
constitutional responsibility for their public education systems, which are run by 
state-based departments of education.  Australia’s public education systems have 
been highly centralised in each state since their emergence over a century ago.   
Grounded in social democratic politics and the community school movement, 
Australia’s national policy agenda in the 1970s shifted dramatically towards a focus 
on decentralisation but it was not systematically adopted at the time due to resistant 
education unions and the parochial nature of state-federal relationships.  By the 
1980s and 1990s, however, school governance and management was successfully 
repurposed in some states to reflect the operational know-how of NPM, or what 
Lingard, Hayes and Mills (2002) describe as ‘corporate managerialism’.  The most 
far-reaching of these reforms emerged in the south-eastern state of Victoria in the 
early to mid-1990s with the introduction of the Schools of the Future (SOTF) 
programme.  Led by Kennett’s Conservative Government, SOTF sought to create 
schools that in lots of ways resembled businesses (Blackmore et al. 1996).  SOTF 
devolved administration and resource allocation to schools, introduced business 
planning, and instituted market competition as a mechanism of incentive and 
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regulation.  Moreover, SOTF introduced a skills-based model of school councils in 
which an emphasis on recruiting individuals with business and governance know-
how aimed to remodel schools on private sector logics and business ontology.  While 
across jurisdictions the uptake of NPM has been piecemeal and provisional 
compared to Victoria, national and state education policies over the past decade 
have promoted the conditions for competitive, corporate practices in schools. 
 
Independent Public Schools (IPS) represents the most recent radical changes to 
Australian education.  Initiated in the state of Western Australia (WA) in 2009 before 
being adopted and modified in Queensland, IPS has been supported by a $70 million 
(AUD) federal program to support increased head teacher autonomy.  IPS is 
endorsed as a model of self-directed service design and delivery for the public sector 
(Fitzgerald and Rainnie 2011).  Replacing direct management by the centre, IPS 
operates on a contractual model in which a Delivery and Performance Agreement for 
each school stipulates agreed outcomes and responsibilities (Gobby 2016).  The 
performance targets stipulated in these agreements usually include the literacy and 
numeracy results of the national standardised testing regime implemented yearly by 
the Australian Curriculum and Reporting Authority (ACARA).  To achieve 
performance improvement, IPS enables schools to adopt administrative and 
strategic responsibilities which include responsibility for recruiting staff, determining 
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staffing profile, managing budgets, procuring and managing contracts, opting out of 
some department policies, developing a business plan, and establishing a school 
board as part of its governance structure.  Rather than a mechanism of local 
participation and representation, the school board aims to attract those with 
‘governance capital’ who can enable schools to achieve their strategic and 
accountability goals (Gobby and Niesche 2019).  A similar, albeit rearticulated set of 
NPM trends can be observed in England, often with comparable outcomes. 
 
The development of NPM as a mode of public sector organisation emerged in 
England in the 1980s and 1990s against a background of various market-based 
reforms to education introduced by the then Thatcher and later Major Conservative 
government.  Key to these reforms was a focus on the role of parents as 
discriminating consumers and choosers of education provision (Wilkins 2012) and 
increased responsibility for schools as managers of their own provision, whose 
budget was now linked to their student intake.  These reforms not only encouraged 
greater competition between schools but compelled schools to be attentive to market 
concepts of supply and demand, in effect securing the technocratic embedding of 
NPM as a principle of school governance.  The popularisation of NPM as a mode of 
school governance is particularly evident in the case of administratively self-
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governing schools, that is, schools operating independent of local government 
management. 
 
During the 1980s new publicly funded schools called City Technology Colleges 
(CTCs) were introduced in England under the terms of the Education Reform Act 
1988 and the Local Management of Schools (LMS) to enable greater school 
autonomy.  It wasn’t until the 2000s under Blair’s New Labour government that this 
model of school governance – maximum delegation of financial and managerial 
responsibility to the school governing body – was expanded to include more schools, 
specifically ‘underperforming’ schools.  Designed to tackle ‘educational 
disadvantage’ (DfES 2005, 29), the academies programme made it possible for 
private sponsors to run inner-city, publicly funded schools pursuant with a contract 
with the Secretary of State.  The transference of liability of the school’s assets to a 
private sponsor has given rise to wider public concerns however, namely a concern 
that under conditions of devolved management some school governors are not 
effective at discharging their responsibilities as custodians of public interest (Wilkins 
2016).  Increasingly, therefore, academies face huge pressure from the government 
and school’s inspectorate, the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services 
and Skills (Ofsted), to operate through a strict focus on upward accountability and 
‘risk-based regulation’ (Hutter 2005) underpinned by financial and performance 
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monitoring, in effect further entrenching NPM as a dominant framing for school 
governance. 
 
Like CTCs, academies are run by a board of trustees who, through the acquisition of 
a foundation of trust, function independent of local government with discretionary 
powers to determine their curriculum, admissions and staff pay and conditions.  
While the scope of the academies programme under Blair’s New Labour government 
was limited to opening 203 academies between 1997 and 2010, the programme was 
expanded exponentially in 2010 following the formation of the Coalition government 
(a cooperation between the Conservative and Liberal Democratic party).  The 
introduction of the Academies Act 2010 by the Coalition government was pivotal to 
these reforms in that it enabled all ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’ schools (and, for the first 
time, primary schools) to apply to the Department of Education (DfE) to convert to 
academy status.  Aligned with these trends, and parallel to trends in Australia 
(Gobby and Niesche 2019), has been a narrow instrumental focus to ‘modernise’ or 
‘professionalise’ governance through appointing only suitably qualified, skilled and 
experienced individuals to the school governing body (Wilkins 2016), namely 
individuals who are best placed to carry out compliance checks, auditing, 
performance appraisals, and standard evaluations in the name of ‘good governance’. 
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In contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries like England and Australia where ‘evaluation 
and accountability instruments are explicitly used to promote school competition and 
choice, and are more clearly attached to school rankings and merit-based pay 
formulas’ (Verger, Fontdevila and Parcerisa 2019, 15), other countries, such as 
Nordic countries, or Switzerland, have ‘embraced an outcomes-based management 
approach to education and introduced more centralised (and standards-oriented) 
curricula’ (ibid, 7).  Public education in Switzerland faced intense NPM reforms in the 
1990s (Hangartner and Svaton 2013), during which time school autonomy, output-
orientation, competition, and school choice were promoted as policy instruments to 
increase the quality of education in view of the challenges of economic globalization 
(Buschor 1997).  While several attempts to introduce a quasi-market education 
system underpinned by school choice has largely failed due to Swiss citizens voting 
against such initiatives (Diem and Wolter 2013), elements of NPM, including a focus 
on organisational autonomy and leadership, integrated pedagogical initiatives and 
data-driven technologies as principles of school governance, are evident in the 
Swiss education system (Dubs 2011, 7-8).  Although the idea of school autonomy 
successfully aligned with some of the emancipatory concerns of the 1970s in 
Switzerland (Deutscher Bildungsrat 1973), its managerial translation has been met 
with resistance by Swiss teachers and scholars who fear an ‘economisation of 
education’ and the loss of teacher autonomy (Forneck 1997).  Yet the scope and 
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operation of NPM in Switzerland is subject to centralised mechanisms of control 
enacted by state authorities called ‘cantons’ and therefore differs from the devolved 
management structures occupied by school leaders and governors in the context of 
England and Australia. 
 
In contrast to England and Australia, where ‘double-devolution’ has resulted in 
greater responsibilities for school leaders and governors as managers and overseers 
of the educational and financial performance of the school, in Switzerland the same 
set of roles and responsibilities are typically structured under the jurisdiction of 
twenty-six cantons.  At the same time, and similar to England and Australia, there 
are opportunities for citizen participation in school governance in Switzerland.  The 
participation of local citizens in school governance in Switzerland dates back to the 
establishment of public schooling in the early nineteenth century (Criblez 1992), at 
which time citizen participation in school governance was celebrated as a bulwark 
against the excesses of state control.  Yet despite the scope of citizen participation in 
school governance in Switzerland, it is principally cantons who regulate education 
laws and policy while municipalities and, increasingly, head teachers that manage 
schools (Hangartner and Heinzer 2016).  This has implications for who inhabits and 
performs key roles and responsibilities in the field of school governance, and 
therefore who is likely to encounter NPM in their daily work.   
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Governance and leadership 
 
In both England and Australia, significant responsibility has been devolved to school 
leaders and school boards as custodians of public interest and ancillaries to 
government rule through performance-management of staff and students (Gobby 
and Niesche 2019; Wilkins 2016).  In Switzerland, similar trends can be observed 
through the nationwide creation of professional school leaders or head teachers 
since the 1990s (Rhyn 1997), whose role as school managers has not only 
profoundly altered established multi-level governance relations but also undermined 
the contribution of democratically-elected school boards (sometimes called ‘strategic 
bodies’) placed in charge of administering schools.  Increasingly, professional school 
leaders now perform the work once delegated to school boards, leading some 
cantons and municipalities to abandon the role of school boards altogether (Rothen 
2016).  Despite the propagation of devolution in Swiss education policy, NPM 
reforms, with their emphasis on performance indicators and output measurements, 
have resulted in the disempowerment of local democratic participation in school 
governance (Quesel, Näpfli, and Buser 2017).  Similar trends in the development of 
NPM as a mode of public sector organisation can be observed in Spain. 
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In 2012 the Popular Party (PP) was elected to government in Spain after eight years 
of socialist rule under the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) or Spanish 
Socialist Worker’s Party (translated).  One of the first laws passed by the Popular 
Party was Ley orgánica para la mejora de la calidad educative (LOMCE) or The 
Organic Law for the Improvement of Educational Quality (translated).  Inspired by 
neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideals (Viñao 2016), LOMCE is, according to Bonal 
and Tarabini (2016), the culmination and synthesis of three interrelated policy trends, 
namely ‘conservative modernization’ (represented by an appeal to ‘back to basics’ in 
the curriculum); new expanded forms of ‘liberal’ models of management; and 
increased systems of evaluation with greater influence over education processes 
and structures and their outcomes.  It was also around this time that the Spanish 
government promoted a ‘wave of inevitable austerity’ (FAES Foundation 2011), 
resulting in the total government expenditure for education between 2009 and 2013 
being reduced by 16.6% from €53.895MM to €44.974MM.  In relation to national 
GDP, these figures place Spain at 4.36% of expenditure in education, when the EU 
average is 4.9% and OECD average 5.3%.  As the PP leader and former prime 
minister Mariano Rajoy explained in a meeting organised by the PP think tank FAES 
Foundation (2011): ‘We are going to promote the reform and modernization of the 
public education sector under the principles of austerity, transparency and 
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efficiency’.  As Bonal and Verger (2017) argue, the PP appear to favour austerity 
programmes and cutbacks in education spending primarily as opportunities to 
advance neo-conservative, neo-liberal, low-cost models of education planning.   
 
In terms of its effects, LOMCE was successful in both inscribing and naturalising 
economising discourses of efficiency, standardisation and output control as principle 
drivers of school governance, all of which can be traced to the technocratic 
embedding of NPM within the day-to-day administration and operation of schools in 
Spain, from the introduction of competitive pay structures (or performance-related 
payment) to performance monitoring to complement school ranking systems.  These 
NPM prerogatives reflect a transformation in school governance best described by 
Ball and Youdell (2007, 14) as ‘endogenous privatization’, namely ‘the importing of 
ideas, techniques and practices from the private sector in order to make the public 
sector more like businesses’.  Similar to the conditions and effects of NPM 
documented above in other countries like England and Australia, the introduction of 
LOMCE has contributed to dismantling some of the most enduring democratic 
features of the Spanish education system since the 1980s (Collet-Sabé and Tort 
2016).  These democratic features include, among others, the removal of the 
statutory right of elected members of the Consejo Escolar (or school board) to vote 
on important issues related to the supervision and management of schools (see 
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Cobano-Delgado 2015).  Since 1985 Spanish education laws have positioned 
families as one of the key actors contributing to school boards through democratic 
participation and mechanisms of voice and vote.  The ever-deepening relationship 
between Spanish education and NPM, as evidenced by the introduction of the 
LOMCE, has signalled a shift away from such democratic priorities, specifically 
removing the voting rights of parents on matters concerning school governance and 
instead stressing the importance of greater efficiency, cost reduction and 
performance management as drivers of school governance (Bonal and Tarabini 
2016). 
 
Alongside the repurposing of the direction and responsibility of the school board, 
there has been a ‘professionalisation’ of the role of head teachers in Spain since the 
introduction of the LOMCE.  Since 1985, Spanish law dictated that head teachers 
were primus inter pares among school staff, meaning that the role of the head 
teacher was formally equal to teachers yet conferred seniority owing to their 
experience.  Like teachers, head teachers have since the creation of Spanish law in 
1985 been imagined in the role of civil servants in which their contribution to the 
school was aligned with a sense of ‘public duty’.  Since the introduction of LOMCE, 
however, the role and responsibility of the head teacher has been reimagined 
through a narrow instrumental focus on the managerial and technical requirements 
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of maintaining schools as businesses (Collet-Sabé 2017).  A similar, albeit differently 
articulated set of changes to the role of head teachers can be observed in the 
context of Australia and Switzerland too. 
 
The WA Education Department and Education Minister in Australia sought to avoid 
the pitfalls of previously fraught attempts at decentralisation (namely, the conflict with 
the teachers’ union that resulted in teacher strikes in the 1990s) and the pragmatic 
challenges of giving autonomy to schools ill-equipped to handle back-door functions, 
responsibilities and liabilities.  To smooth the process of reform, directors at the 
Education Minister and the Department of Education WA chose to eschew the 
excesses of autonomy reforms witnessed elsewhere, such as full administrative 
decentralisation and the deregulation of student enrolments.  What resulted was a 
focus on establishing specific ‘flexibilities’ that appealed to head teachers, namely 
recruitment and budgets.  Devolved management was therefore subject to school 
community consultation (schools opt into the IPS program) and assessment of 
suitability for autonomy based on track record.  Teachers’ fears of such reforms were 
largely assuaged by the decision of the government and Department to retain an 
industrial platform for securing employment conditions and protections, which was 
negotiated with the union and worked to prevent head teachers from dismissing staff. 
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The suggestion here is that the local enactment of IPS in Australia deviates from 
idealised models of NPM.  There is evidence, for example, that some school leaders 
subscribe to managerial and entrepreneurial forms of professionalism in their 
construal of schools as businesses for which they are responsible (Gobby 2017).  
Head teachers overseeing devolved management structures tend to prioritise 
financial management, input-output models of decision-making and market 
strategies to increase enrolments, improve reputation and obtain competitive 
advantage (Fitzgerald et al 2017; Holloway and Keddie 2018).  There is, however, 
evidence of resistance to the use of NPM as a tool of self-governance among some 
IPS schools.  Traditional public service-oriented conceptions of the teaching 
profession remain active in the collective repertoire of the knowledge and practices 
of some head teachers and teachers (Gobby 2017).  Some head teachers of IPS 
schools, for example, have spoken of their commitment to strengthening the public 
education system, their resistance to pursuing competitive advantage over 
neighbouring schools and their use of educative and culturally-sensitive forms of 
leadership that promote student and community engagement, equity and social 
justice (Gobby 2017; Keddie, Gobby and Wilkins 2017).  Nevertheless, while NPM 
does not limit how public schools are understood and operate, IPS represents the 
continued ascendancy and consolidation in Australia of the rationalities and 
techniques of markets, technocratic managerialism and systems of performativity. 
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In Switzerland, NPM reforms have altered accountability relations which resulted in 
the diminishing autonomy teachers once enjoyed in their classrooms.  Moreover, the 
supervision and evaluation of teachers is no longer conducted principally by cantonal 
inspectors or school inspectors commissioned by cantons and by local school 
boards.  Instead, it is head teachers who have been entrusted to perform such a 
role, while the cantonal and municipal authorities supervise the work of head 
teachers. These changes thus hierarchise governance and internal relations within 
the teaching staff and undermining the de facto autonomy of teachers (Vogt 2002).  
Head teachers are now expected to advance school development and to push 
pedagogical reforms mainly defined by the ministry, yet in practice they are 
overburdened with the kind of techno-bureaucratic work we come to associate with 
NPM (Windlinger and Hostettler 2014). 
 
On this account, NPM has influenced school governance in Switzerland through 
professionalising school management and leadership, hierarchising school 
organisation as well as by introducing new processes of evaluation and data-based 
accountability.  Attempts to devolve responsibilities and power to schools and 
municipalities (which previously enjoyed a great deal of freedom) have been 
undermined by increasing cantonal regulation and intercantonal harmonization of 
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conditions, e.g. the current introduction of an intercantonal standards-based curricula 
(EDK 2011a) or a national monitoring of students' performances (EDK 2011b).  On 
this account, the idea that NPM reforms have increased the autonomy of schools 
and municipalities is highly questionable (Maag Merki and Büeler 2002).  Instead of 
empowering local actors, the promotion of the 'self-managed' school in Switzerland 
appears to strengthen hierarchical models of leadership and weaken democratic 
measures of accountability (Hangartner and Svaton 2014).  The contradictory 
movement of the ‘self-managed’ school is that it positions local actors, specifically 
head teachers, as bearers of new strategic roles and supervisory responsibilities so 
as to adapt teaching and learning to national and international trends.  NPM 
instruments have been implemented within an unchanged low-stake accountability 
context, however, in which teachers do not face serious sanctions if they fail to meet 
standards or neglect certain policies (Brauckmann et al. 2015).  Understood from this 
perspective, NPM reforms have not replaced traditional government structures but 
instead produced something akin to a hybrid assemblage in which and old and new 
instruments of governing are overlaid and come into conflict with each other 
(Hangartner and Svaton 2015).  As Wilkins (2018a) demonstrates in the context of 
England, co-operative academies, namely academies with co-operative principles 
grafted onto them, have developed out of a similar set of problematic alignments 
since they work to achieve partial congruence of different interests and stakes by 
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combining seemingly conflicting practices of technocratic managerialism and 
‘deliberative democracy’ through a focus on stakeholder participation.   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The international and comparative literature on school governance points to 
variegation in the formation and expansion of different national education systems 
(Conolly and James 2011).  Evidence shows that national education systems are 
primarily geo-political constructs situated within complex socio-economic histories 
with significant variations in their local and regional development according to the 
powers of intervention devolved by central government to different multi-scalar 
actors and agencies, from municipal and county authorities to privately-run school 
management groups and school boards.  This does not mean subscribing to a view 
of ‘methodological nationalism’ and of subnational and national education systems 
as impermeable to global policy forces, forces that include privatisation management 
of education services (Ball and Junemann 2012), international comparative 
assessment (Schleicher and Zoido 2016) and transnational advocacy networks and 
global business communities (Macpherson 2016).  Yet, as our analysis shows, it 
does mean acknowledging that subnational and national education systems are 
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resilient structures that develop through ‘path-dependent and contingent processes 
of policy instrumentation’ (Verger, Fontdevila and Parcerisa 2019, 1), each with their 
own ‘specific semiotic, social, institutional and spatiotemporal fixes’ (Jessop and 
Sum 2016, 108).  As stated by Van Zanten (2002, 302), ‘states cannot avoid global 
pressures to change in specific directions, but they can twist and transform to fit 
national purposes and opportunities’. 
 
In Spain, for example, the state government shares responsibility with seventeen 
regional authorities to inform and guide the development of school governance, 
albeit a large number of important education decisions, whether they relate to law 
making, funding allocation or assessment frameworks, are centralised and organised 
by the state.  In contrast, school governance in Switzerland is organised through 
state authorities called ‘cantons’ who create their own education laws as well as 
share powers with municipalities to intervene in the running of schools (Hangartner 
and Svaton 2013).  Similarly, schools in Denmark are governed by municipal-run 
‘standing committees’ and superintendents who oversee financial responsibility for 
schools within their jurisdiction (Moos, Kofod and Brinkkjær 2015, 30) while in 
Scotland funding allocation and teacher recruitment is controlled by local education 
authorities (LEAs) (Shields and Gunson 2017).  In contrast to these highly politicised 
arrangements, education provision is no longer the exclusive remit of government 
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authorities in countries like England (Wilkins 2016), Australia (Gobby 2016), South 
Africa (Karlsson 2002), and New Zealand (Jacobs 2000) where, increasingly, non-
political actors like school leaders and governors have responsibility for resource 
allocation, curriculum, admissions, and staff pay and conditions.  From this 
perspective, school governance takes on a multiplicity of forms to reflect ‘multi-level 
systems, encompassing state agencies, municipalities and schools’ (Paulsen and 
Høyer 2016, 87) and their concomitant laws, regulatory regimes and patterns of 
centralisation and decentralisation. 
 
In this paper we have documented the influence of NPM on education through a 
situated analysis of the development (and non-development) of certain policy 
instruments in the context of four OECD countries: Australia, England, Spain, and 
Switzerland.  A key focus of our analysis has been to document the ‘different modes 
of insertion’ (Clarke 2008, 137) through which NPM has been appropriated and 
revised in the field of school governance and against the background established 
cultural traditions, situated practices and normative commitments.  From the 
perspective of a decentred approach (Bevir 2010, 437), we have evidenced the 
emergence of NPM as ‘a contingent product of a contest of meanings in action’, 
given that it is tactically deployed and rationalised differently within differing geo-
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political settings to complement pre-existing political-administrative arrangements 
and practices. 
 
NPM can be loosely characterised as a form of ‘endogenous privatization’ (Ball and 
Youdell 2007, 14) in that it reflects ‘an approach in public administration that employs 
knowledge and experiences acquired in business management and other disciplines 
to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and general performance of public services in 
modern bureaucracies’ (Vigoda 2003, 813).  The development of NPM within 
education, as evidenced in each of the four countries examined in this paper, 
appears to make a necessity of apolitical, corporate, business-driven models of 
educational leadership and management (Gunter 2009) and the technocratic 
embedding of universally-prescriptive conditions and practices by which 
organisations can be evaluated, measured and compared to determine their 
effectiveness, efficiency and continuous improvement.  Moreover, such policy 
instruments, where they are enacted properly, provide governments, parastatal 
agencies and transnational organisations with improved methods to intervene to 
determine agendas, shape priorities and manage incentives and expectations 
(Wilkins 2018b).   
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Whether under conditions of limited decentralisation (in the case of Spain and 
Switzerland) or under conditions of medium to high decentralisation (in the case of 
England and Australia) NPM functions to situate schools within a field of 
‘interoperability’ (Sellar and Gulson 2018, 69) and wider systems of 
‘commensurability, equivalence and comparative performance’ (Lingard, Martino and 
Rezai-Rashti 2013, 542), thus interlinking and overlapping subnational, national and 
global policy processes and trends.  However, as our analysis also evidences, it is 
important to remain attentive to the ‘messy actualities’ of policy enactments rather 
than assume an unfetttered unfolding of a priori global policy processes (Larner 
2000, 14).  While NPM carves out spaces and practices through which schools might 
be constructed as measurable organisational entities poised for competition and 
comparative analysis and performance tracking (Gobby 2013), our analysis 
demonstrates the complex patterning and layering of NPM within different geo-
political settings owing to the historical development of their unique political-
administrative structures. 
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